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Managing and preparing for emerging infectious diseases – A multi-
stakeholder strategic partnership approach towards avoiding a catastrophe
Abstract
The extent and impact of neglected diseases has been well documented in the public health and 
medical science literature. However, from a strategic management and organizational 
perspective, there is a gap in first, identifying the key stakeholders and second, understanding 
the complex relationships that underpin the functioning of Product Development Partnerships 
(PDPs). The PDPs are a type of public private partnerships (PPPs) in the global health system 
that are specifically formed to address the challenge of lack of new drugs for such diseases. 
PDPs act as strategic system integrators and in that role they facilitate smooth and successful 
actions of key stakeholders in the context of managing the drug development process to address 
neglected and emerging infectious diseases. It is against this backdrop, that this paper focuses 
to (a) identify the importance and relevance of PDPs in the development of new drugs for 
neglected and emerging infectious diseases; and (b) identify the key stakeholders, their 
relationships and (levels) of dependencies in PDPs. In the process we further contribute by 
developing a model that illustrates the complex interrelationships between these stakeholders 
that governs the potential success of fighting emerging infectious diseases. Our model offers a 
unique perspective to the strategic alliance literature by not only showing the complex 
interrelationships between the various stakeholders at the global level but also in highlighting 
various capabilities required in overcoming challenges. These are identified to include 
managing power, trust and governance challenges. Theoretically, we utilize the resource 
dependency lens to develop our model, arguing that PDPs become dependent on the external 
resources (stakeholder actions) and that such resources are key to organisational success as 
access and control over these stakeholder actions is a basis for greater success. Based on our 
extensive analysis of the literature and the contextualisation of the recent Novel Coronavirus 
epidemic as a case we offer conclusions and reflections on the ability of PDPs to mitigate risks 
related to neglected and emerging infectious diseases from a management perspective.   































































The evolving pandemic of the Novel Coronavirus is an illustration of the consequences of lack 
of effective drugs leading to catastrophic consequences. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) identifies antimicrobial resistance as one of the greatest threats to global health, and if 
not taken care of, could lead to medical catastrophe. The resistance to existing classes of 
antibiotics and greater incidences of emerging infectious diseases necessitates the need for 
faster development of new and effective drugs (Global Risk Report, 2018; Yang et al., 2018; 
Nambiar et al., 2014; Zorzet, 2014; Silver, 2011; Hsueh et al., 2005). In this context, public 
private partnerships (PPPs) are considered crucial in addressing the challenges in the 
development of new drugs, particularly for neglected and emerging infectious diseases (Varda 
et al., 2012; Vecchi and Hellowell, 2018). Although PPPs are not a new phenomenon (see 
Watts, 2016), these arrangements gained momentum in the context of global health system in 
1993 following the call from the World Health Assembly to the WHO to mobilize and 
encourage support from various partners in global health system. As a result, the WHO 
incorporated ‘partnering’ as one of the core functions to address global health challenges (see 
Buse and Waxman, 2001). 
In the global health sector, PPPs are collaborative relationships that involve a wide 
range of actors and stakeholders, including governmental agencies and intragovernmental 
organizations (as public actors) and research institutes, commercial pharmaceutical companies 
and professional (as private actors). de Vrueh and Commelin (2017) identify two different 
types of PPPs in the context of global health sector. The first is known as Product Development 
Partnerships (PDPs), that are formed to develop pharmaceutical solutions for low and middle 
income countries; whereas the second type of PPPs, known as ‘pre-competitive PPPs’, are 
formed to generate novel scientific concepts (e.g. disease targets) and infrastructure (e.g. 
databases) by pooling of complementary expertise and knowledge, and sharing of rewards. 
Apart from these two types, another type of PPP exists in the form of ‘access partnerships’, 
which are formed to exclusively focus on delivery of existing technologies or health service 
delivery (Grace & Britain, 2010).  
Notwithstanding the increasing formation of PPPs in general and PDPs in particular 
and their significance in the global health system, there is a gap in the strategic management 
and organisational literature on the phenomenon. In fact, issues pertaining to functioning of 
PPPs and PDPs have attracted negligible attention in this field. We concur with the assertions 
by many public health scholars that PDPs are a critical mechanism to address deficiency of 
necessary drugs for many diseases, particularly neglected diseases and ones that affect the 






























































poorest countries the most (Ridley, 2001; Widdus, 2001; Mahmoud et al., 2006; Moran, 2005; 
Munoz et al., 2015). Hence, the success of PDPs are central to avoid a catastrophic ‘doomsday 
scenario’. It is under this backdrop that we argue more research is needed to develop better 
insight on the relationships between various actors and their overall functioning. Thus, 
exploring, examining and understanding these arrangements is central to avoiding a 
catastrophe, which essentially requires a multi-stakeholder approach towards addressing 
emerging infectious diseases. 
Therefore, the focus of this paper is to identify the importance and relevance of PDPs, 
as a hybridised form of PPPs, in the discovery and delivery of new drugs for emerging 
infectious diseases towards avoiding a catastrophe. Based on our identification and 
investigation of the main actors involved in PDPs and their roles and partnerships, we develop 
a model, utilising the resource dependency theory as a lens that illustrates the complex 
interrelationships (and dependency) that governs the potential success of fighting emerging 
infectious diseases. We contribute to the management literature by identifying previous PDPs 
and formation of existing PDPs in relation to the recent outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus. 
Our model delineates the complex nature of relationships between various set of actors 
involved in the functioning of the PDPs. In this respect, it adds to the strategic alliance and 
outsourcing/subcontracting literature in the sense that it highlights three underlying dimensions 
that are all based on trust, power-sharing and appropriate incentive structures, and governance 
challenges at the global level. 
Historical context of the emergence of PDPs as a hybridised form of PPPs 
The global health system, particularly since the beginning of the millennium has undergone 
significant changes, primarily to integrate research, development, and delivery of health 
interventions. Traditional actors who shaped the global health system, notably the WHO, the 
supranational health organisation and national health ministries of major developed and 
developing countries, are now joined by non-government organisations, private organisations, 
philanthropists and in some cases representatives of civil societies. As a consequence, the 
nature and landscape of the relationship between the old and the new actors have also 
undergone change, often manifested with the emergence of new norms, expectations, and 
approaches of interacting and functioning. The WHO describes public–private partnerships for 
health as “public sector programmes with private sector participation” (WHO, 2015c), a vague 
definition that allows for many forms, shapes and sizes of PPPs. The image of a contemporary 






























































PPP is one, wherein a government organization / partner sits at one end of the table, setting the 
priorities and rules under which private organizations operate (WHO, 2015c). On the other end 
are private for-profit entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and/or large multi-
stakeholder initiatives such as Roll Back Malaria, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria and (Dare, 2003). Alongside these bilateral (vertical) interactions, 
multiple stakeholder PPPs have become a common feature (Gustaven and Hanson, 2009; Aerts 
et al., 2017). The key players within the PPPs in the global health system, include PDPs such 
as Stop TB, TB Alliance, the global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the Medicines for 
Malaria Vaccines (MMV), which now occupy centre stage in their respective disease categories 
have gained legitimacy as they are considered as the most promising form of collectively 
addressing some of the longstanding challenges in the global health system. It is critical to 
highlight that increase in the international support for the newer institutions have led to a 
relative and, in some cases, absolute decline in the financial and structural importance of 
traditional actors. 
A significant number of PDPs emerged in the late 1990s  (Nwaka and Ridley, 2003; 
Munoz et al., 2015) in response to a growing concern of lack of new drugs for so-called 
neglected diseases or diseases of tropical countries and public outrage directed at the big 
pharmaceutical companies due to their lack of interest in developing new solution for these 
diseases that predominantly affect people in low- and medium-income countries. Interestingly, 
the historical move towards PDPs could be traced to the creation of the United Nations 
Development Programme/World Bank/WHO special programme for Research and Training in 
Tropical Diseases (WHO-TDR) in 1975. WHO-TDR was an effort to enable a partnership-
oriented approach to drug development by bringing private and for profit companies on board 
(Lang and Greenwood, 2003). At that point in time, although some public sector organisations 
in different countries had taken an interest in developing solutions for different disease 
categories, only a handful, including the Walter Reed US Army Institute for Research 
(WRAIR) and Central Drug Research Institute (CDRI) in India, focused on establishing their 
own drug development infrastructure (see of instance, Nwaka and Ridley, 2003). Also critical 
to emphasise here that by late 1980s, most of the pharmaceutical companies had gradually 
disengaged from developing new drugs for tropical diseases, primarily due to lack of health 
insurance system and reduced ability of the users in these countries to afford and pay for the 






























































drugs (Aerts et al., 2017). Lang & Greenwood (2003) also suggest that the tension between the 
WHO and the pharmaceutical companies to make drugs accessible at affordable prices, also 
contributed to the decision of the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw from undertaking 
R&D activities for neglected diseases (also see Patnaik, 2011). As a direct result between 1975 
and 1999, only 13 new drugs were developed for neglected diseases and almost all the new 
drugs were essentially either combinations or extensions of existing drugs (Troullier et al., 
2002; Craft 2008; Veenken and Pecoul, 2000). 
Overuse of existing drugs, particularly in the absence of new options, resulted in a 
situation wherein the existing drugs became resistant and ineffective thus creating conditions 
for epidemics particularly malaria and HIV – Aids. Growing epidemics, lack of availability of 
new drugs and public outrage, in the developed countries towards disengaged pharmaceutical 
companies and global health institutions provided the context for deliberation at the 1993 
World Health Assembly that opened the doors for public private initiatives in the global health 
system. 
Roles and features of the PDPs and identification of key actors 
Traditionally, the central actors for neglected and emerging diseases were most notably the 
WHO and national health ministries. Since the early millennium, this arrangement has 
undergone change with greater involvement of an ever-greater variety of civil society and 
nongovernmental organizations, private firms, and private philanthropists. New partnerships 
such as WHO's Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM), which was formed as a partnership 
between UN agencies in 1998 and PDPs such as the Stop TB, the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization (GAVI), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM) and Medicines for Malaria Ventures (MMVs) and DNDi have come to exist 
alongside and somewhat independently of traditional intergovernmental arrangements between 
sovereign states and UN bodies. 
The first two PDPs, namely the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the 
Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) were established in the late 1990s, with the support 
from the Rockefeller Foundation and the WHO Special Programme for Research and Training 
in Tropical Diseases (WHO/TRD) along with UNDP and the World Bank. The Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation (BMGF) and the Rockefeller Foundation have played central role in setting 
up a number of other PDPs, such as the Global Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development 






























































(TB Alliance), the International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) and the Paediatric Dengue 
Vaccine Initiative (PDVI). In 1999, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1999, committed the Nobel Peace Prize fund to setting up a working group on 
innovation & access, which in 2003 led to the creation of DNDi with five public sector 
institutions from endemic countries, including India, Brazil, Malaysia and Kenya and the 
UNDP/World Bank / WHO’s Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (WHO-TDR). Moran (2005) identified approximately 65 neglected disease projects 
in 2004 and attributes the emergence of PDPs for this spur R&D activities. Munoz et al., (2015) 
also highlight the increasing collaborative approach to drug development for neglected diseases 
and note that more than 300 organizations from the private and public sectors 
(academic/research institutions, biotechnology companies and other medium and small firms, 
such as contract research organizations, and large pharmaceutical companies) are engaged in 
the development of a combined pipeline of 374 drugs and vaccines for 23 neglected diseases 
(BioVentures for Global Health 2012; also see Pedrique et al., 2013). The PDPs have 
contributed in the change in R&D landscape for neglected diseases by, in essence becoming 
the central organizations for specific diseases and in that role they coordinate communication 
and coordinational activities with a range of organisations, with varied focus, philosophies, 
funding sources and business models (Moran et al. 2010; Nwaka and Ridley 2003). 
Table 1 exemplifies the three key PDP actors. Examples of other PDP organisations 
include the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), the Foundation for Innovative New 
Diagnostics (FIND), and the International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM). Based on table 
1 showing the key PDPs operational in the past, we observe rapid formation of PDPs to develop 
new vaccines for the treatment of the novel Coronavirus. In table 2 we show the varied 
partnerships being developed at the time of writing this paper. 






























































Table 1 - Organisational agendas and modus operandi of key PDPs
Product Development 
Partnerships (PDPs)
Main focus Funding source Key roles
The Medicines for 
Malaria Venture 
(MMV)
Focuses on a single 
disease and manages a 
vast project portfolio, 
from lead generation 
through to clinical 
development and 
regulatory registration.
It receives the 
majority of its 
funding from the 
Gates Foundation
-Plays a key coordinating 
role in the global 
pharmaceutical effort 
against malaria
-Defines the target profiles 
of future pharmaceuticals
The Drugs for 
Neglected Diseases 
Initiative (DNDi)
-Maintains a close 






-Has a vocal stance on 
matters of IPRs and 
access to medicines
Maintains a policy of 
not relying on any 
individual donor for 
more than 25 percent 
of its budget. In the 




91.8 percent of the 





research in 2009. 
Concentrates on the ‘‘most 









Focus on a single disease, 
but has developed a more 
markedly entrepreneurial 
profile, adopting traits of a 
biotechnology start-up. 
Generates a funding 
stream independent 
of external donors.
Experimented with a 
different approach to 
Intellectual Property (IP), 
creating its own patent 
portfolio in order to attract 
partners 
Source: (Adapted from Lezaun & Montgomery, 2015, pp 5-6)






























































Table 2 - Key PDP partnerships being created for the Novel Coronavirus epidemic, 
leading to a possible pandemic.
PDP partner 1 PDP partner 2 PDP partner 3 Output
University of 
Nebraska Medical 
Center (UNMC) in 
Omaha, US
National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID), part 
of the National 
Institutes of Health 
(NIH)










COVID-19. Initiated a 
clinical trial which 
was originally 
developed to treat 
Ebola and in animal 
studies showed 
promise in treating 
SARS and MERS, 
which are caused by 
coronaviruses.
U.S. National Institute 
of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID), part of the 
National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) 
Moderna researchers in 
collaboration with 
scientists at the NIAID 
Vaccine Research 
Center (VRC). 
Funding for the 
manufacture of the 





For the study. mRNA-
1273 is a mRNA 
vaccine that encodes 
for a prefusion 






Government of China 
Health Department 








China Medicine Health 
Industry Co.
 Government of China 
Health Department
Speeding production 
of chloroquine. This 
drug appears to be 
effective in treating 
the coronavirus with 
no severe side effects. 
It has been in clinical 






















part of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and 
Response, US. 
U.S. Department of 
Health and Human 
Services (HHS).




vaccine candidate that 
it had worked on 
during the 2002-2003 
SARS outbreak, as it 
is similar to the 
COVID-19 virus.







































































part of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and 
Response, US. 
U.S. Department of 
Health and Human 
Services (HHS).
Producing antiviral 
drug approved to fight 
Covid-19 outbreak 








Chinese group led by 
its founder, Emeritus 
Professor Bin Wang 
from the prestigious 
Fudan University and 
China's premier DNA 
vaccine expert. 
Supported by a $9 





Inovio has launched 
preclinical testing for 
clinical product 
manufacturing vaccine 
INO-4800, against the 
coronavirus. 
Source: Various media and pharmaceutical organisation reports 
PDPs role as system integrators / facilitators 
Public health scholars conceptualize the creation and functioning of PDPs in the broader 
context of the medical product / health innovation ecosystem that operates beyond national 
boundaries (Monuz et al., 2015; Papaioannou et al., 2009). The product development 
ecosystem includes amongst others, (a) the community of for profit and non-profit 
organizations, including (bio) pharmaceutical organizations, academic and R&D; (b) 
government institutions including national regulatory authorities; and (c) individuals 
(including public health researcher and scientists and policy-makers in disease-endemic 
countries and patients) that has an influence on the functioning of the PDPs. In essence, the 
innovation ecosystem is comprised of multiple actors who are engaged in the production and 
dissemination of drugs, vaccines and diagnostics for neglected diseases, and it is influenced by 
external factors particularly pertaining to public health policy, issues relating to financing, 
regulation and intellectual property apart from human resources and infrastructure. The expert 
commission under the auspices of the World Health Assembly (WHO, 2006) delineated the 
following four principles that guide the health innovation ecosystem, and which in essence also 
provide the overarching guidance to the R&D activities of the PDPs. The guiding principles 
are: 
 Availability: new product development and adequate supply (quantity) of product
 Acceptability: usability and appropriateness of the product tailored to specific needs
 Quality: product effectiveness, standards for carrying out testing and clinical trials






























































 Affordability: ensuring the financing of product development and procurement, 
affordable prices. 
Features of PDPs
PDPs in this context, function as ‘system integrators’, in the sense that they facilitate the 
development of new drugs by integrating / bringing together expertise of different stakeholders 
in the broader health innovation ecosystem (Munoz et al., 2015). Put simply, at one end, the 
PDPs, work towards generating funds from key funders, including philanthropic organizations, 
and on the other hand tap into the knowledge base of partners from academia, public and private 
sector organisations and various international agencies into long term partnerships to leverage 
each other’s strength towards a common goal of developing a new drug for the focused diseased 
category. In essence, most PDPs work as virtual non-profit R&D organizations, essentially 
possessing technical expertise and provide an oversight in undertaking all product development 
activities – upstream (research and discovery) and downstream (clinical trials and 
manufacturing) with different set of partners (Morel et al., 2005; Munoz et al., 2015). Akin to 
large pharmaceutical companies, PDPs actively manage a portfolio of product development 
projects and in the process they spread their risk and to increase the chance of success (Grace 
and Britain (2010). The PDPs have independent scientific-advisory boards, who are responsible 
for selection of product development projects and selection of partners. Such a selection 
process is considered as seen as a key advantage, cushioning donors from picking the funding 
winners/losers and placing that responsibility with those who have better information and 
expertise with which to make those decisions (Grace and Britain, 2010; Munoz et al., 2015). 
To summarize, the following are the distinctive features of PDPs: 
 PDPs are established as non-profit entities that guarantee them independence and no 
shareholder expectations of growth and revenue maximization motives; 
 The objectives of the PDPs is to develop new medical products that can have a public 
health impact (specialized, access core to their mission); 
 The focus of the PDPs is to develop and enhance ‘system integration ‘capabilities to 
engage and leverage diverse resources and capabilities of various actors in the R&D 
chain; 
 PDPs possess technical expertise to manage a portfolio of R&D projects; 






























































Key actors in PDPs, Model Development and Theoretical Lens
The medical product innovation ecosystem (Munoz et al., 2015) depicts various stakeholders 
who are involved in the development and delivery of new drugs. In this context, it is critical to 
highlight that the distinctive features and organisational design of a PDP fundamentally 
differentiate them from other R&D focused organisations in the innovation ecosystem. 
Since, PDPs operate on a not for profit model, they rely on donor organisations for 
funding their R&D projects and operations. Public and philanthropic donors, it is argued, 
measure return to investment differently than is the case of shareholders in the pharmaceutical 
industry or venture capitalists in the biotechnology R&D model (Lezaun & Montgomery, 2015; 
Moran et al., 2010; Looney, 2011; Grace & Britain, 2010). It is considered that philanthropic 
and public donors do not exert the same pressure as shareholders and venture capitalists and 
instead they are more interested in facilitating development of the final output - medical 
products developed to address unmet health needs1 (Moran and Stevenson, 2013). Moran et al. 
(2010) in an analysis of 14 PDPs working in the area of neglected disease R&D found that 
almost 49% of the funding came from one source, namely the Gate Foundation. Munoz et al., 
(2015) consider ‘funding’ to be the central enabling factor that underpin the collaborative 
approach to R&D that are adopted by the PDPs. In outsourcing and sub-contracting R&D, the 
PDPs only have to pay for the services to the scientists involved in the research activities and 
contract research and manufacturing organisations who undertake other research, clinical trial 
and basic manufacturing activities. This approach allows the PDPs to reduce the cost of product 
development. It is in this backdrop Chataway et al., (2007) argue that PDPs also act as brokers 
amongst numerous private and public sector organizations, by bringing them together in the 
context of the drug development process. Thus, in essence, PDPs also leverage investments 
from private partners, particularly larger pharmaceutical companies, in the form of “in- kind” 
inputs such as pro-bono human resource inputs and access to proprietary molecular libraries 
(Grace & Britain, 2010). Considering the importance of funding and its availability, in most 
cases PDPs have picked up dormant or discontinued research developed elsewhere for product 
development. In other words, PDPs have and are focusing on the development of repurposed 
products rather than new chemical entities (NCEs) (Pedrique et al. 2013). The two factors that 
constrains the capacity of the PDPs to focus on the development of NCEs are: (a) PDPs do not 
possess either financial muscles and scientific capabilities in house to develop new NCEs and 
hence on one hand they have to manage their relationships with the funders and on the other 
1 See PDP Funders Group (www.pdpfundersgroup.prg)






























































hand they coordinate developmental work with their operational partners; and (b) the new drugs 
have to be accessible and affordable to the people who most need those the most (Brooks et 
al., 2010). Therefore, success for PDPs are not in terms of development of new products rather 
development of products that are effective and affordable. Hence, the capacity of the PDPs to 
be effective and successful is underpinned by their capability to manage different relationships, 
they form with different actors. In the subsequent section, we discuss these relationships, which 
we argue are central to PDPs existence and functioning by adopting resource dependence 
perspective.    
            
Discussion 
Theoretically, we utilize the resource dependency theory in bringing together different aspects 
underpinning the PDP phenomenon. Resource dependency theory is based on the principle that 
organisations, such as PDPs engage in partnerships, transactions and networks, with other key 
actors in its environment to access and acquire resources. We posit the view that such 
‘dependency’ on each other’s resources create conditions for success at one hand and survival 
at the other. Resource dependency perspective also sensitises us to adaptations organisations 
make as they deepen their reliance on other actors. We observe that PDPs as non-profit-
organisations are dependent on the one hand on their funders for funding purposes and they are 
also dependent on the other hand on large and small pharmaceutical and diagnostic and 
biotechnology companies to undertake research and development of new drugs. We argue that 
the capacity of PDPs to engage in these two sets of relationships is central to develop new 
therapeutic solutions for emerging infectious diseases to mitigate risks from these diseases, 
thus avoiding catastrophic situations. In figure 1, we depict the two sets of relationship between 
PDPs and the key actors, whose resources, skills and knowledge, the PDPs utilise to develop 
new drugs. Subsequently, consistent with resource dependence perspective, we analyse the two 
sets of relationships on the lines of (i) power relations; (ii) trust relations; (iii) governance 
structures / mechanism. We argue that, these three aspects underpin the relationship between 
PDPs and their financing and operational partners and hence success and survival of PDPs, 
inevitably depends on their capacity to manage these nuances. 
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PDPs and relationship with the donors / funders (Power and Trust)
Moran et al. (2010) identified three categories of donors involved in the global health 
innovation system. Of the three, the public sector is the most prominent source of funding for 
the PDPs and contribute more than two third of the total funding and within that category, the 
public sectors from high income countries and multilateral organizations contribute more than 
95% of that total and the rest is made up of funding from the lower and medium income 
countries. The philanthropic organizations are the second set of donors, who contribute almost 
20% of the total funding and the bio-pharmaceutical industry, comprising of large and small 
and medium enterprises contribute the rest. The contributions of these key donors have more 
or less has remained consistent over the last decade (see for instance Moran et al., 2009; G-
Finder report, 2018).  From the perspective of the PDPs, the source of funding assumes critical. 
The funding from the government, disbursed through the public sector organizations, is 
generally given as unrestricted or semi-restricted grants that allows the PDPs to use or allocate 
between different individual projects depending on the progress the projects make. Also, in 
some instances, the PDPs use the resources to support capacity building and advocacy work, 
which is not specifically focused on a particular project rather on overall strategies of the PDP. 
In contrast, the funding from the private donors, are more restricted in terms of how the funding 
could be utilised and would need permission from the funder if any changes are made, based 
on evolving pace of project development (Grace, 2010). Private donors, follow their own 
approach to evaluate different projects that rely on their funding and in most instances the 
approach private donors follow is different to the one that PDPs follow and therefore 
duplication of approaches to review projects complicates the relationship between the private 
funders and the PDPs. 
Resource dependence theory highlight the notion of power relations in the context of 
resource dependence between organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2009). 
Seen through the lens of PDPs, their functioning and survival, critically depends on their 
capacity to access financial resources from different sources and in that respect it is imperative 
that the portfolio of financial resources achieves a balance between unrestricted, semi-restricted 
and restricted funding (Boulton et al., 2014; Moran et al., 2010). Extant literature highlights 
that the power relation in the overarching relationship between PDPs and their donors, 
particularly the private donors, is skewed towards the private funders. Munoz et al., (2015), in 
highlighting the power yield by donors, particularly in attaching conditions for PDP, note that, 
“in PDPs, donors decide on the priority areas for funding, the conditions attached to fund 
disbursements, instruments for control, transparency requirements etc. These requirements are 






























































not harmonized among PDPs, nor are they made public” (Munoz et al., 2015: 326). The further 
concur that amongst the different groups of donors, private donors, philanthropic organizations 
in particular, are most likely to put constraints on how their funding is used and dictate the 
priorities of the PDPs. Boulton et al. (2014: 36) identified five ways donors impose constraints 
by limiting the use of funds to: 
(a)  A specific disease, product area or stage of development; 
(b) A group of projects (portfolio funding); 
(c) A specific project to the exclusion of all others; 
(d) Exact submitted budgets, thus, making any changes or variations needing prior 
approval; and 
(e) A certain timeframe (usually after the signing of a funding agreement and within a 
specific year).
One of the critical implications of this asymmetric relationship between the donors and 
the PDPs is that the efforts to develop new drugs and services may actually lead to a situation 
wherein the products or services developed in the process may not directly affect the disease 
endemic countries. In other words, the focus of the donors might not be congruent to the needs 
of the disease endemic countries and as a result the product portfolio of the PDP might not 
directly contribute to address the needs of the disease endemic countries. Notwithstanding, the 
imbalance in the power relationship between the PDPs and the donors, particularly the private 
sector funders, the donors also have to rely on the PDPs to develop effective solutions. Success 
of PDPs, also legitimise the donors, who are essentially new actors the in the broader gamut of 
the global health innovation system (Grace, 2010; Moran et al., 2009). This paradoxical 
relationship, in essence demonstrates the complexities underpinning the global health 
innovation system and highlights the need for distinctive capabilities of the board members and 
senior managers of the PDPs to align and manage the focus of the PDP with the interests of the 
funders, industry partners and the governments in the countries where the needs for the 
therapeutic solutions are the highest. Put simply, success of PDPs, akin to any dependent entity 
in an unfavourable exchange relationship, depends on its capacity to absorb constrains as it 
makes progress to deliver outcomes (Gargiulo, 1993; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). 
The issues relating to interdependence and power relations, bring to forth two 
interrelated constructs, namely, (a) governance of the relationship between PDPs and the 
donors in particular; and (b) trust relationship between the PDPs and the funders. Considering 






























































the PDPs are not for profit organizations, they aim to keep their costs down. According to 
Moran et al. (2010), almost 88% of the funds that the PDPs generate from donors are disbursed 
to their academic partners, companies undertaking developmental work and other drug 
development activities. In the process, the PDPs also contribute in developing research and 
development capacity in disease endemic countries (Grace, 2010; Pratt and Loff, 2012). Thus, 
the PDPs are organised around being effective and efficient in getting the development of new 
drugs. Most of the PDPs comprise of small core team, who have experience in public health 
and pharmaceutical industry and these members, in essence, manage various aspects pertaining 
to operational aspects of the PDPs including project and portfolio management. The work of 
the core staffs is overseen by a board and external advisory members, who bring scientific and 
technical expertise to the PDPs (Moran et al., 2010; Munoz et al., 2014). The board plays a 
critical role in shaping the overall strategic focus of the PDPs whereas scientific and technical 
experts provide advice on upstream and downstream activities pertaining to the drug 
development process. The composition of the board and the involvement of scientific and 
technical advisors are critical from two perspectives. First, it helps generate competence and 
capability trust in the PDP. Trust is one of the central themes in inter-organizational 
relationships (Zaheer and Harris, 2006; Lumineau and Quelin, 2012) that in essence mitigate 
risks and uncertainty (Rousseau et al., 1998). In a dyadic inter-organizational context, 
competence trust, pertains to confidence of one partner on the resources and capabilities of the 
other partner. Although the PDPs lack resources and capabilities of private pharmaceutical 
companies to undertake research and development activities, the involvement of board 
members and scientific and technical experts provide donors the confidence that PDP possess 
intellectual capital and expertise necessary to ensure efficient and effective development of 
new products (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Zahra, Filatotchev & Wright, 2009; Kim & 
Cannella, 2008). The second implication of involvement of experienced board and scientific 
and technical experts pertains to legitimization of the PDPs. Apart from creating conditions for 
competence trust, involvement of experts also facilitate legitimisation of the PDPs (Boulton et 
al., 2014; Munoz, et al., 2014). 
The evaluation of the relationship between the donors and PDPs generally takes place 
through evaluation mechanisms. From the perspective of the donors, demonstration of value 
for money (VfM) is the central rationale that underpin evaluation of PDPs and their activities 
(see Boulton et al., 2014). VfM, in essence, aims to demonstrate optimal use of donor’s 
resources to achieve the intended outcomes, which essentially pertain to development of new 
drugs. Although there is a lack of insight on how different donors evaluate their funding, 






























































Canada’s International Development Research Centre’s (IDRC) donor partnership division, 
which engages with multiple donors, evaluate VfM on the basis of the contribution to the three 
E’s: 
• Economy: getting the best value
• Efficiency: maximising the outputs for a given level of inputs
• Effectiveness: ensuring that the outputs deliver the desired outcome (IDRC, 2013)
PDPs relationship with operational partners (Governance)
Most of the PDPs involved in developing new drugs and other solutions for neglected diseases 
do not possess developmental expertise and hence do not undertake any in-house research or 
development activities. What in essence, the PDPs possess is intellectual capital and expertise 
and experience of senior managers involved in overseeing the organization and functioning of 
the PDPs.  Broadly, PDPs comprise of two category of individuals who are critical for their 
functioning. First, in most PDPs, the core team comprise of experienced individuals possessing 
background in public health and research and development in the area of neglected diseases. 
These individuals play the critical role in designing and shaping the strategic orientation, in 
consultation with the board and advisors, and organizational form of the PDP. Second category 
of individuals are project managers, who have prior experience of overseeing and managing 
drug development programmes. Whereas the first category of individuals provides strategic 
direction to PDPs, scan and identify opportunities in the medical innovation ecosystem and 
interact work with funders to raise capital to develop new products, the project managers forge 
and drive the drug discovery and development activities in collaboration with various 
operational partners in the global health innovation ecosystem. In essence, the role of project 
managers, is akin to one that that any project managers in (bio) pharmaceutical companies 
perform. 
However, there are two fundamental difference between a (bio) pharmaceutical 
company and PDP. First, unlike pharmaceutical companies, PDPs focus on either a single 
disease category or in some cases set of disease categories and second the PDPs function as 
‘virtual R&D organizations’ (Nisar and Hayter, 2017; Moran et al., 2014; Munoz et al., 2015; 
Grace, 2010), wherein most of the R&D activities are outsourced to partner organizations. The 
focus, orientation and organization of PDPs is underpinned by the drive to keep the R&D and 
operating cost down. Munoz et al., (2015) note, “while PDPs have to cover the cost of the 






























































product development and take into account the costs of product delivery (including registration 
cost), PDPs are aware that they need to stay as close as possible to the marginal cost of 
production to meet their access goals” (p.322).  In this backdrop, outsourcing of R&D activities 
is a central strategy PDPs adopt to achieve the objectives. In a broad context, outsourcing is 
not uncommon in the (bio) pharmaceutical industry (see for instance Howells et al., 2008; 
Lowman et al., 2012; Schuhmacher et al., 2016) and in fact, countries such as India in 
particular, has emerged as one of the key locations that have benefitted from this phenomenon 
(see for instance Mohiuddin et al., 2017). Therefore, unlike the relationship between the PDP 
and its funders, where the funders tend to have an upper hand, the relationship between the 
PDP and its operational partners is skewed in favour of the PDPs.  
Two questions are central to the question of outsourcing of R&D activities. First 
question pertains to identification and selection of a reliable partners to undertake different 
activities in the drug development process and in this context reputation and trust in the 
competence and capabilities of the partners (Das and Teng, 1998; Zaheer and Harris, 2006), 
particularly in the case of using of contract research organisational and contract manufacturing 
organisations. Munoz et al. (2015) note that PDPs tend to enter into operational relationship 
with partners with whom either the project managers or senior managers have had experience 
of working with. This aspect in essence supports the assertion that trust relationship formed 
through prior history or interaction between organizations and key boundary spanners influence 
formation of partnerships between organizations (Gulati and Sytch, 2009; Gulati et al., 2012). 
And second question relate to structuring of these relationships. Seen through the lens of 
resource dependence perspective, the type of governance mechanism partners enters into, 
particularly in such types of buyer – supplier relationships, depends on dependency between 
the two parties, criticality of the resources, and the power difference between both the partners 
in the relationship (Handfield, 1993; Fink et al. 2006  Extant literature on collaborative 
relationships in high technology industry setting suggest that contractual agreements, instead 
of equity structures, are considered as preferred governance mechanism in such relationships 
(see Narula and Hagedroon, 1999; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006). Although in respect to 
identification, selection, negotiation and management of the collaborations with the partners, 
the project managers play central role, there is less insights on the nature of contractual 
agreements that exist between the PDPs and their operational partners. In this backdrop, critical 
issues relating to the implications of asymmetrical relation between the PDPs and their 






























































operational partners, particularly academic institutions, needs deeper examination (Munoz et 
al., 2015).   
Conclusions
In the context of the global heath innovation ecosystem, the PDPs have emerged to play the 
role of system integrators, who primarily bring together resources, knowledge and expertise 
residing in various stakeholders in the ecosystem to develop solutions, particularly for 
neglected diseases. Most PDPs function on a non-profit basis, and lack financial capital and 
proprietary knowledge base to undertake R&D activities to develop new drugs (Chataway et 
al., 2007; Munoz et al., 2015). Hence, their core capabilities are their relational capital prowess, 
through forming relationships, with the donors / funders on the one hand and with multiple 
partners who contribute their intellectual capital to undertake operational activities on the other 
hand, and this underpins PDPs role in the global health ecosystem. Considering the complex 
relationships, the PDPs establish with two different set of actors / stakeholders in the innovation 
ecosystem, it is imperative that success and survival of PDPs depends on their capabilities to 
manage the differing nature and orientation of power relations, governance mechanisms and 
trust that underpin the relationships PDPs enter into. Since their emergence, PDPs have shown 
to contribute to develop and create a pipeline of new solutions. 
Notwithstanding the centrality of PDPs in the development of new drugs and other 
solutions for neglected diseases, from strategic management and organizational perspective, 
we identified a gap in understanding the complex functioning of these phenomenon. In this 
paper we attempt to plug this gap, and do so by using the resource dependence perspective, 
wherein we have attempted to discern and examine the nature of relationships between the 
PDPs and their funders and donors on one hand and between the PDPs and their operational 
partners on the other. We note that in their relationship with the PDPs, the donors, particularly 
the private donors have an upper hand often determining how the funding would be used by 
attaching various conditions as well as adopting different approaches to evaluate the 
performance of the PDPs (power and trust challenges). In contrast, the relationship between 
the PDPs and their operational partners, which primarily comprise of contract research 
organisation, contract manufacturing organisations and numerous research institutes, is skewed 
towards the PDPs (governance challenges). However, the nuances underpinning the 
relationships between PDPs and the funders and donors as well as between the PDPs and the 






























































operational partners are still hazy, though we have made an attempt in this paper to make things 
clearer and unbundle the complexities that exist in these relationships. 
We conclude our assessment by identifying the key success factors to be managing 
power, trust and governance challenges. We dig into past PDPs (for AIDS, TB and Malaria, 
disease categories where most PDPs have distinct presence) and formation of existing PDPs in 
the context of the prevailing Novel Coronavirus epidemic, and conclude by calling for the need 
for more focus / research on the two sets of relationships that the PDPs form and manage to 
develop new drugs and solutions. 
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